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When Praxis Breaks Down: What Heidegger’s Phenomenology
Contributes to Understanding Miscues and Learning in Reading
CONFERENCE DRAFT – PLEASE DO NOT REPRODUCE!
Introduction
In this paper I present Heidegger’s (1962) ontological notion of learning within the
context of meaningful dealings with the use and breakdown of “equipment” and the
subsequent revelatory ontological disclosure of “world” and Dasein’s Being-in-the-world with
the intent of intimating how Heidegger’s notion of “problem solving” as breakdown-andrevelation within our practical (and original) learning situations might contribute to a
philosophically reconfigured understanding of the way in which educators understand and
enact problem-solving and learning in the reading curriculum, e.g., as related to reading
instruction and literacy as it is expressed in Whole Language (Goodman 1996, 1986, 1976;
Kohn, 1999; Weaver, 1990). Goodman (1996) describes the reader in terms of what might be
described as Being-in-the-world-of-reading, which, I suggest, shares certain similarities with
Heidegger’s philosophy of “absorbed coping,” or “circumspective seeing,” within our practical
dealings (Dreyfus 2001). According to Goodman, reading is never simply “recognizing
[cognitively representing] words in succession,” rather “something propels you forward as you
read, helps you to anticipate so well what’s coming that you simply use cues [or miscues] from
the print to move constantly toward meaning” (40). For Heidegger, meaning is also crucial and
ultimately it is towards-which our practical dealings, in terms of system of relations, or referential
totality, are directed. Just as there is a world of “absorbed coping” in Heidegger, set within the
overarching system of relations that is our world that is lit up or revealed in moments when
praxis breaks down, momentary “miscues” in the reading process also hold the positive
potential to open up a world, which is as well set within the overarching context of a system of
relations (world) that forms the context from out of things make sense to us, things are
interpreted and understood, out of which ultimately we construct and derive meaning for our
life and Being.
What Disruptions and Breakdowns Disclose about Learning and Being-in-the-world:
Heidegger on Dasein’s Referential Totality and World
How do we primarily learn and understand within our practical and involved dealings
with entities, others, and the world? In response we must first define, or perhaps redefine,
praxis in terms of the original Greek sense as involved and concerned dealings with the stuff of
the world and others. As Heidegger points out, praxis should never be conceived as being
directed by or in service of theory (theoria), as we find in traditional and contemporary
empirical-scientific philosophies of education. Praxis is our concern (Besorgen) with the entities
we encounter, and beyond, it is a concern for the Being of those entities in terms of their
“equipmentality,” and the unfolding of their Being occurs and is disclosed in use and their
Being belongs to a context, or system, of relations, which Heidegger terms the “Totality of
Equipment” (97/68). Heidegger indicates that it is not through scientific, or thematic, modes of
world disclosure that we primarily know the world, this, as Dreyfus (2001) points out, is
because Heidegger recognizes the “inadequacy of the traditional epistemological account of
occurrent [present-at-hand] subjects with mental contents directed towards occurrent [present-athand] objects” (85). The Being of equipment along with the Being of Dasein is never granted
thematically, or “theoretically,” in terms of merely occurring things, or present-at-hand entities,
rather, through our concerned and intimate practical dealings we learn through a mode of
world-disclosure Heidegger calls “circumspection” (Umsicht).
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Heidegger (1962) insists that speculative seeing is not “a thematic seeing,” however, it is
not for this reason “epistemologically blind,” for indeed it “has its own kind of sight by which
our manipulation is guided and from which it acquires its specific Thingly character” (89/69).
Dreyfus (2001) calls circumspection a “mode of awareness” and is best understood as
“experience” that is “characterized only as openness,” but this is not, Dreyfus assures, an
experience that is purely “mental, inner, first-person, private subjective experience (Erlebnis,
Husserl’s term), separate from and directed toward nonmental objects” (69). When we cope
with things in praxis our “comportment manifests dispositions that have been shaped by a vast
amount of previous dealings, so that in most cases when we experience these dispositions
everything works the way it should” (68). It is crucial to note that Heidegger opposes practical
comportment, which includes problem solving, in terms that are grounded in the Cartesian
subject-object split, which adopts the view that the world can be known, controlled, and
mastered when we apply the representational [eidetic] mental schemas formed through
“thematic seeing.” And this has crucial implications for the way in which contemporary
education views the unfolding of the continuum of and relationship between theory-practice:
“Practical behavior,” Heidegger (1962) assures us, “is not ‘atheoretical’ in the sense of
‘sightless.’ It is an oversimplification of things to simply say that in theoretical behavior we
observe and in practical affairs we act, and that action must employ theoretical cognition if it
not to remain blind” (99/69).
In line with these thoughts, Heidegger’s view of human intentionality, or “absorbed
coping,” is not that of a “mind content directed toward objects [or situations], and a new sort of
entity encountered (transparent equipment) which is not a determinate, isolable substance”
(Dreyfus, 2001, 69). We do not need to leave the confines of our subjective modes of Being in
order to meet the world that resides outside of our minds, nor do we need to assimilate it,
through the re-presentation of the world by means of our internal thoughts. This is because, as
Heidegger (1962) philosophizes, we are always already in the world as Being-in-the-world. Thus,
we neither actively situate ourselves within an “environment,” nor it is possible to
ontologically remove ourselves from the “environment” in a “theoretical” manner by means of
the virtual or thematic “dress rehearsals” of our problems, for the kind of “Being which
belongs to such concernful dealings is not one into which we need to put ourselves first. This is
the way in which everyday Dasein always is” (Heidegger, 1962, 96/67). When we encounter
problems, or disruption to the flow of praxis, which Heidegger refers to as breakdowns to the
“non-thematic circumspective absorption in references or assignments constitutive for the ready-tohandness of an equipment whole,” a new form of coping, a more precise, a form of
circumspection, emerges (107/76). Heidegger, avoiding the specific concern with the mental
representation of the so-called “problem,” wants to “concentrate more on the specific
experience of breakdown, that is, on the experience we have when ongong coping runs into
trouble,” and when this occurs, “new modes of encountering emerge and new ways of being
encountered are revealed” (Dreyfus, 2001, 70).
I now examine the unique way in which Heidegger (1962) claims that we encounter and
attempt to overcome problems, for his view is far more complex than “scientific methods” that
focus on solving isolated aspects unique to the specific problem encountered. For Heidegger, it
is never simply about overcoming the problem alone, beyond this, it is about the ontological
relation between the problems we encounter and the unfolding of our Being-in-the-world in its
entirety. The process itself is in fact a “learning” experience that is happening in a way that is
anterior to any and all formalized and systematized forms of education. According to
Heidegger (1962), and this relates to his notion of ontological truth as aletheia, or disclosedness,
scientific methods for problem-solving are derived from and dependent on basic and original
modes of concernful, circumspective coping. All forms of “thematic intentionality,” according
to Dreyfus (2001), if Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein is correct, “must take place on a
background of transparent coping” (85). The approach to the reduction of practical
comportment to “theories,” as we find in the notion of the “expert/educator” problem-solver
in Darling-Hammond & Bransford (2005), who possesses the skill to transform “knowing-how”
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into a “knowing that,” runs into trouble when “facts and rules ‘discovered’ in the detached
attitude do not capture the skills manifest in circumspective coping” (Dreyfus, 2001, 86).
Heidegger writes of three specific forms of disruption, or moments of breakdown-andrevelation, which Dasein encounters within circumspective coping, i.e., there are three kinds of
disturbances for Heidegger, wherein what is “ready-to-hand,” a piece of equipment, becomes,
or better, shows itself, as “un-ready-to-hand” in that we are no longer able to use it, and these
modes of breakdown-and-revelation are: conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, and obstinacy.
Conspicuousness (of the unavailability of equipment) occurs when a piece of equipment we are
using breaks or fails to function at its appointed task, but we are able to move beyond it to
complete the task, and this “presents the ready-to-hand equipment as in a certain un-readinessto-hand” (103/74). Obtrusiveness occurs when a piece of equipment is missing and we can’t
use it, and the “more urgently we need what is missing, and the more authentically it is
encountered in its un-ready-to-handness, all the more obtrusive does that which is ready-tohand become” (103/73). Obstinacy is a serious disruption that calls for deliberation on our
parts because the phenomenon of the un-ready-to-hand “stands in the way of our concern”
(103/74). These latter two modes of breakdown-and-revelation will be explored in some depth as
related to our themes, but it must be noted that all three modes of disturbance to praxis for
Heidegger reveal a variety of aspects of Dasein’s existence, including the worldliness of the world,
as will be outlined. Speaking on the three modes of disruption Heidegger states that they
all have the function of bringing to the fore the characteristic of present-at-hand in what
is ready-to-hand. But the ready-to-hand is not just observed and stared at as something
present-at-hand; the presence-at-hand which makes itself known is still bound up in the
readiness-to-hand of equipment (104/74).
This indicates something unique about “mistakes” and “problems” and the manner in
which they are viewed, and beyond, experienced, namely, when encountering equipment, or
tools, that cease to function momentarily, are recalcitrant to our efforts to get them to work
again, or are simply absent, we do not encounter them as mere “things” or “objects” in
isolation from the task. In fact, Heidegger suggests that in these moments of breakdown it is
not the “thingness,” or ontical aspect, of the equipment that is revealed, but rather it is the
Being of equipment, or the “readiness-to-hand” of tools in their use, as “equipmentality,”
which is already imminent (although transparent) in the unfolding of praxis that makes its
presence known. The presencing of the Being of equipment might be understood in terms of
what Macquarrie & Robinson (1962) write about Heidegger’s use of the term for “disclosure,”
aufschliessen, which does not mean that we infer a “conclusion from premises,” working
through a mode of deliberation that is discursive in nature, but rather aufschliessen means
to “lay open.” To say that something has been “disclosed” or “laid open” in
Heiddegger’s sense, does not mean one has any detailed [or thematic] awareness of the
contents which are thus “disclosed,” but rather that they have be “laid open” to us as
implicit in what is given [within a totality of relations], so that they may be made
explicit to our Awareness by further analysis or discrimination of the given, rather than
by any inference from it (fn. 106/76).
Dreyfus (2001) describes the need for “deliberate coping” when we lose the transparency
of engaged action, and our activity becomes “explicit” and we are forced to “act deliberately,
paying attention to what we are doing” – this is obtrusiveness (72). It is in this moment that the
meaning and significance associated with equipment references are laid open for us, for as
Heidegger (1962) claims, “when assignment has been disturbed – when something is unusable
for some purpose – then the assignment [and not the individual piece of equipment] becomes
explicit” (105/74). When our activities are interrupted we are forced into a mode of
deliberation, however it must be noted that this type of deliberation bound up with problem
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solving in circumspective coping is never thought of in terms of a detached form of abstract
(thematic) seeing/conceptualizing. To reiterate what was previously introduced, this
represents a traditional, and, according to Heidegger, an erroneous account of praxis, which
“supposes that a subject is related to an object by means of some self-sufficient mental content”
(Dreyfus, 2001, 73). This is not to say that deliberation as conceived by Heidegger does not
involve “mental content,” for we do “have beliefs and desires and experience effort – but these
need not involve the sort of self-sufficient mental entities philosophers since Descartes have
supposed,” i.e., that they are purely mental and analyzable without reference to the world (74).
Dreyfus makes clear that deliberation is never a “pure detached theoretical reflection described
by the tradition. Rather it must take place on the background of absorption in the world” (74).
But what is the phenomenon of “world” to which Heidegger refers in relation to Dasein’s
Being?
To begin, I analyze exactly what Heidegger claims is laid open or lit up in the moment of
breakdown-and-revelation occurring within instances of practical comportment when we
experience problems with equipment. When tools function properly in our everyday ways of
using them, their “readiness-to-hand,” or Being as “equipmentality,” remains inconspicuous to
us, this phenomenon was referred above as “transparency.” On the contrary, when a tool
ceases to function, when there is a disruption or breakdown in the flow of our practical
activities, it quickly draws the attention of the user, but not to the tool in particular, rather
beyond the tool, to the entire system of relations of which the tool belongs as an integral part of
a web of relations (referential totality of equipment) as it is directed toward a specific task. At the
instant of breakdown, Dasein catches sight of everything connected to the work: The totality of
the workshop, so to speak, is lit up, or revealed. The nature of “equipmentality” and the
referential totality of the “ready-to-hand” are simultaneously made explicit, disclosing the
overall purpose through the in-order-to, towards-this, and the for-the-sake-of-which – components
in Dasein’s referential “equipment” totality, and this is a concern with the “Being of those
entities within-the-world which we proximally encounter,” as ready-to-hand, as well as the
“Being of those entities which we can come across and whose nature we can determine if we
discover them in their own right by going through the entities proximally encountered” as
present-to-hand (Heidegger, 1962, 121/88). There is yet another ontological structure and
dimension of circumspective coping, which is intimately linked with the Being-with (Mit-sein)
of other Dasein and that is the revelation of the overarching context within which Dasein’s
referential equipment totality is located, and this
third kind of Being gives us an existential way of determining the nature of Being-in-theworld, that is, of Dasein. The other two concepts of Being are categories, and pertain to
entities whose Being is not of the kind which Dasein possesses. The context of
assignments or references. Which as sgnificance, is constitutive of worldhood, can be
taken formally in the sense of a system of Relations (121/88).1
It is necessary to explore briefly how the referential totality of equipment is organized
in such a way as to have intimate meaning for Dasein’s Being and its potential-for-Being, and
this will lead into a discussion of the worldhood of the world. The ontological manifestation of the
“world” as world occurs in moments of obtrusive disruptions, e.g., when tools or equipment go
1

As introduced here, with the philosophizing of the referential totality and the phenomenon of the worldiness of the world,
Heidegger is also indicating the crucial notion of the communal nature that belongs to Dasein’s Being-in-the-world as Mit-sein,
or Being-with others. I always encounter others as belonging to my world; I am always dealing in one way or another with the
Being of others, those whose Being is similar to my own. Polt (1999) makes this point with an excellent example: “I always
experience things in relation to other people…The glove is not only my glove; it is the glove I bought from the clerk at the shop
owned by so-and-so, and fashion authorities this year recommend the design. If I rub two sticks together to make fire, I am
imitating what I once watched another do. In short, there is a social context for all the equipment we use. So even when no other
people happen to be around, I acknowledge their importance simply by using something. My ways of using the thing, and the
thing itself, as a tool, refer to my human community” (60).
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missing completely from the “towards-which” totality of equipmentality, and in this instance,
“what was transparent in everyday coping becomes explicit – when the referential totality is
disclosed – world announces itself” (105/74-75, emphasis added). Importantly, when moving
from equipment to Dasein, as it were, this totality, which is originally set within the context of
the workshop, is now set within the larger context that Heidegger refers to as the “where-in” of
the world and this indicates that all of our dealings with equipment is ultimately for the sake of
our Being and our Being is Being-in-the-world. Heidegger indicates this in the following way:
The “primary ‘towards-which’ is a ‘for-the-sake-of-which,’ and the [ultimate] for-the-sake-ofwhich always pertains to the Being of Dasein, for which, in its Being, that way of Being is
essentially an issue” (116-117/84).
The “wherein” of an understanding which assigns or refers itself, is that on the basis of
which one lets entities be encountered in the kind of being that belongs to
involvements; this “wherein” is the phenomenon of the world. And the structure of that
on the basis of which Dasein assigns itself is what makes up the worldliness of the
world (119/86).
This, however, is not to indicate that the for-the-sake-of-which functions in terms of an explicit,
intentionalistic, futurally projected goal, and here we must keep in mind what was stated earlier
about eidetic abstraction (thematic seeing) not playing a crucial role in the process of Dasein’s
involved, everyday coping, for when encountering the for-the-sake-of-which “we do not need to
introduce a mental representation of a goal at all. Activity can be purposive without the actor
having in mind a purpose” (Dreyfus, 2001, 93). Heidegger incorporates this term to represent
the non-intentionalistic “endpoints we use in making sense of a flow of directed activity”; the
for-the-sake-of-which is a “self-interpretation that informs and orders all of my activities” (94-95).
More important than “knowledge” of one’s situation or surroundings, for Heidegger, is
the “meaning-significance” for one’s life emerging from out of the situations within which we
find ourselves, and hence “world” for Heidegger, and the successful navigation thereof, is
never primarily an issue for epistemology, rather, as we can see, it is undoubtedly an
ontological issue first and foremost. Our understanding, and the projection that is bound up
with it, is always dependent upon the “wherein” that is the context of the world, and this is
always an understanding in praxis, for as Heidegger (1962) states, “The ‘wherein’ of an act of
understanding which assigns or refers itself, is that for which one lets entities be encountered in the kind
of Being that belongs to involvements; and this ‘wherein’ is the phenomenon of the world” (119/86).
The world is a context for the “primordial totality” of relationships that alone give “meaningsignificance” to Dasein’s life, and both emerge by means of the relational, or referential totality,
of involvement, which is a process of “signifying” (bedeuten) through this relational totality the
sense of “significance” (Bedeutsamkeit) this has for Dasein’s Being (120/87). We are not made
aware of the ontological structure of our involvement with equipment and others within the
world by means of theories or calculated methods of discernment, but rather the world as
system of relations and meanings manifests within radical moments when the flow of praxis is
disrupted, and for this reason I have termed the phenomenon breakdown-and-revelation. The
disturbance, or problem encountered, makes us aware of the function of equipment and the
way it fits into the meaningful context of our practical activities, which, as Heidegger indicates,
is inextricably bound up with the revelation of the larger phenomenon, namely, that of world:
When an assignment to some particular “towards-this” has been thus circumspectively
aroused. We catch sight of the “towards-which” [for-the-sake-of-which] itself, and
along with it everything connected to the work – the whole “workshop” – as that
wherein concern dwells. The context of equipment is lit up, not as something never seen
before, but as a totality constantly sighted beforehand in circumspection. With this
totality, however, the world announces itself (105/74-75).
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Heidegger’s Phenomenology and Education: Learning and the Whole-Parts-Whole
Philosophy of Reading
There is a way to understand the manner in which mistakes and disruptions are viewed
within the learning process, as described in Heidegger’s phenomenological analysis of Dasein’s
practical and concerned dealings with equipment within the context of the world by relating
these ideas to the view of literacy and reading found in “Whole Language” (Goodman 1996,
1986, 1976), which is expressed through the philosophy of whole-part-whole learning. Although
Whole Language experienced a resurgence of popularity in the 1980s and 1990s it has since
fallen by the wayside, a victim of the “Reading Wars,” wherein the teaching of isolated skills,
code based-systems of recognition, and the championing of phonics instruction (“scientificallybased reading research”) for ensuring literacy eventually triumphed over Whole Language. In
this final section I read Whole Language through the lens of Heidegger’s philosophy in order to
show that “scientific-based” approaches to reading that focus on skill-based areas of instruction
in isolation, have the propensity to obscure the holistic nature of reading and writing. Reading,
I suggest, might be more appropriately, as related to Heidegger’s phenomenology, understood
in terms of always occurring within a “context,” or referential totality, which grounds and
directs the activity of reading itself. Further, it is possible to show that scientific methods in
isolation and didactic forms of instruction for teaching reading obscure the ontological aspects
of our Being as philosophized by Heidegger, which, by reading Goodman (1996) might be
linked to language and reading and their intimate relationship to meaning, i.e., reading for
meaning relates to our lives in intimate ways and our attempts “to make sense of the text is
what drives the whole process” (52).
Working through Chomsky’s challenge to behaviorism, Piaget’s constructivist view of
learning, and Vygotsky’s notion that “active” learning occurs in “play situations,” Goodman
(1976), adopting a holistic approach to reading (reading as “psycholinguistic guessing-game”),
inspired the philosophy/practice of Whole Language (Shafer 1998).2 The basic, albeit
controversial, tenet of this form of reading instruction is that learning to read and constructing
meaning from texts occurs as the reader engages three “cueing systems” - these cueing systems
2

Kozloff (2002), in “Rhetoric and Revolution: Kenneth Goodman’s ‘Psycho-Linguistic Guessing Game’,” presents an eloquent
and seemingly devastating critique of Goodman’s philosophy of Whole Language. Kozloff charges Goodman with committing
no less than three logical fallacies within his claims for holistic reading instruction: (1) the fallacy of the false binary opposition:
Reading is being taught in terms of either “phonic centered” or “word centered,” and offers no further alternatives; (2) the
fallacy of reification: Goodman moves from the analogue, “reading might be like a guessing game” to “reading is a guessing
game”; (3) the fallacy of over-generalization: Goodman moves from “some reading might be like a guessing game” to “all
reading is a guessing game.” Kozloff also brings contemporary empirical evidence to bear on the problem – “recent research on
reading” and “experimental assessments of whole language” – “Controlled longitudinal research shows that instruction on
phonic awareness, decoding, reading fluency, spelling, and comprehension that focuses on specific skills, involves explicit
communications of rules and strategies by the teacher, precisely and logically sequenced, and provides systematic distributed
practice is reliably superior for a wide range of students than implicit (less focused) instruction that requires students to construct
their own knowledge” (1). Goodman conducts no experiments, collects no research showing that whole language instruction is
more effective than phonic centered or word-centered approaches that he seeks to replace. Kozloff calls whole language and the
“psycho-linguistic guessing game” speculation, not science: “A defining feature of science (in contrast to metaphysics, opinion,
fantasy, and madness) is that propositions, arguments, theories, and conceptual schemes are judged viable and scientific not
because proponents say so, but on the basis of empirical evidence and sound reasoning” (3). In the end, the supposed scientific
(“empirical”) data marshaled against Goodman by Kozloff appears to fall into the same trap as much of empirical research in
education, especially research coming from the social and behavioral sciences, namely, all it suggests is a correlation between
data and conclusion, but, much like Goodman’s claims for Whole Language reading instruction, fails to establish the allimportant causal link. As related to Kozloff’s claims, I return to Taubman (2009) who states that the conclusions of empirical
research in education “aspires to the role played by atoms and molecules in physics and chemistry. But the latter offer
explanations, whereas schema and schemata of concepts as defined by the learning sciences offer only descriptions, although
they aspire to explanatory force and nomological certainty” (187).
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are interconnected and unfold simultaneously during the process of reading: The three systems
are (1) Graphophonic; (2) Grammatical (syntactic); and (3) Semantic (meaning): texts are also
composed of these systems (graphophonic, lexico-grammatical, and semantic-pragmatic),
which allow texts to mean for the reader. As Goodman (1986) writes, “The cue systems are
used simultaneously and interdependently,” for example, what “constitutes use of the graphic
information depends on how much syntactic and semantic information is available” (97).
Proficient readers are able to determine meaning by drawing various clues from the cueing
systems in a way that allows them to gather and construct meaning from the text. As related to
Heidegger’s phenomenology, problems or breakdowns (“miscues”) in the reading process
always refer the reader back to the “system,” which might be properly referred to in
Heideggerian terms, the referential totality of reading. Goodman (1997), unlike “intellectualist”
approaches to learning and problem solving, which “assume that mistakes reflect
incompetence, inexperience or carelessness, or some combination of these,” embraces mistakes,
or “miscues,” as part and parcel “of the process of making sense of print” (5, emphasis in original).
Miscues represent the point at which “the observed response (OR) doesn’t match the expected
response (ER),” and miscues “provide windows on the reading process, because they show the
reader attempting to make sense of the text. They reveal as much about the reader’s strengths
as they do about weaknesses” (53). The “miscues” of reading, rather than taking us beyond
and outside the holistic activity of reading, situate us within the totality of reading - the
unfolding of the three systems wherein “what we expect to see has such a strong influence that,
as long as we’re making sense of the text, we overlook our own miscues and the writer’s or
printer’s errors,” while on the other hand, according to Goodman, the miscues that “really
interfere with making sense are not only detected but corrected”( 40). Readers are always using
information from all three systems to make meaning, and when failing to make meaning from a
text they either (1) rethink and reassign new meaning as drawn from the interaction of the
three systems or (2) “regress” to the point where the miscue occurred, they “then use visual
and perceptual information to assign a new structure and meaning,” drawn from the context of
the referential totality structuring the text and the reading thereof (110).
If we were to approach the instruction of reading in terms of a series of isolated
“problems” to be solved or a series of “skill sets” to be mastered, we would approach reading
in terms of the behavioral theorist that Kohn (1999) describes, who wrongly believes it is
“logical in principle to start with the pieces and then put them together, moving from
phonemes to words to sentences to stories,” however, as the author adds, in the real world,
“it’s far more natural and effective for the whole to come before the part” (122). This, according
to Goodman (1996) is analogous to the flawed (atomistic) understanding of reading that would
have us focus on “each letter and each word instead of on meaning,” and in such instances,
we’ve “stopped using the reading process to make sense” (37). As with Heidegger’s
phenomenology of Dasein’s equipmental totality and “world,” Whole Language is grounded in a
holistic philosophy, which, we might say, without a great deal of distortion, embraces the
“world-of-reading,” and emerges from a critique of and dissatisfaction with behaviorism in
education. We refer to it as a whole-parts-whole philosophy because it begins with an
understanding of the whole (the system of relations and assignments) and moves to address
the parts only as they are related to and emerge from, and, eventually lead back to the whole.
This philosophy of education believes that it is impossible for students to learn anything in an
authentic manner through analyzing isolated aspects of the learning system. This philosophy of
reading and literacy also shares another common element with Heidegger’s phenomenology
and that is the issue of “significance-meaning,” which is always anterior to “skills acquisition,”
and so Whole Language represents a “meaning-first approach” to reading. Questions
concerning what meaning the text might have for the student’s life, both in and out of the
formalized setting of education, are crucial to consider according to those advocating and
implementing Whole Language. That is to say, Whole Language asks “original” questions such
as, “What is ultimately at issue when reading and writing?” And beyond, as might be related
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to ontological issues, “How does learning to read and write affect the student’s Being-in-theworld?”
These are important questions about the referential totality of assignments comprising
the instruction of reading and writing, related to how these assignments are set within the
larger context of the school or even the students lives, and answers to these questions are never
reducible to concerns of a purely epistemological nature. To incorporate Heideggerian
concepts, if we begin with the assignment of the “towards-which” of reading, we might begin
by seeking out a definition for literacy, because literacy, it would seem, represents the “goal” of
reading and writing programs. Literacy, while variously defined, might be said to represent the
development of readers’ understanding of spoken worlds, the ability to decode written words,
and overall, to gain a deep comprehensive understanding of the texts she engages. Neuman
(2010) is critical of the definition for “early literacy” established in 2008 by the National Literary
Panel (USA) for being too narrow and overlooking the important aspects of background
knowledge and embedded meaning-making within contexts that inform the student’s
development as a reader. The panel’s findings favor code-based skills for ensuring later literacy
in young readers and “do not sufficiently account for…content-rich settings in which skills are
learned through meaningful activity,” all of which “help children acquire the broad array of
knowledge, skills, and dispositions that build the foundation for literacy learning” (301). Those
who support direct instruction and code-based skills for decoding words, sentences, and texts
are measuring “literacy” by “tallying up children’s scores on standardized reading tests,” and
the problem with this practice is that “most of those tests measure decoding and word
identification, not comprehension,” which of course is a crucial aspect for determining literacy
(Kohn, 1999, 128).
The towards-which of reading, if it is literacy, is poorly and inadequately defined,
quantified, and assessed through standardized testing in today’s educational milieu of social
efficiency. Kohn views the “towards-which” of reading in terms other than rote standardized
numbers and locates literacy in the ability to “communicate more effectively to readers when
you write, and get more out of what you read” (128). Recall what was stated earlier about the
towards-which in Heidegger’s understanding of practical comportment, it is not to be thought of
in terms of an explicit, intentionalistic, and futurally projected goal, Heidegger incorporates this
term (“towards-which”) to represent the non-intentionalistic “endpoints we use in making sense
of a flow of directed activity” (Dreyfus, 2001, 94). The towards-which functions in terms of
Dasein’s “self-interpretation that informs and orders” the activities within which it is involved
(95). In traditional reading instruction we might say that the towards-which of reading is literacy
as determined by a hard and fast goal (telos), which in a disingenuous manner represents the
reification or hypostatization of literacy in terms of a quantitative, calculable value attached to
a standardized exam for determining when and whether or not students have reached the
“intentionalistic” goal of reading fluently and efficiently. Whole Language adopts a far more
fluid and malleable view of “goals” in the reading process, based in great part on social
interaction, and the uniqueness and particularities of the “lived world” (Lebenswelt) of the
classroom as a social dwelling, where “its about having teachers and students decide together
what is worth knowing and how to come to know it,” in such a communal setting for reading,
goals are imminent in the unfolding of the learning (Kohn, 1999, 123).
To move beyond the immediate towards-which of reading, it is possible to understand
the world-of-reading in terms of a system of interrelated references and meanings as set within
the overarching for-the-sake-of-which, which for Heidegger (1962) serves as an explanation for
why we do any and all meaningful activities, namely, “for the sake of a possibility of Dasein’s
Being” (116/84). We make sense of reading in terms of the way it has “meaning-significance”
for our Being-in-the-world. In line with Dreyfus (2001), we should understand reading as an
activity that plays a crucial role within our world, informing the for-the-sake-of-which, which
orders all of our activities, as related to the reading process, in ways that have intimate
meaning for us. This is a far more liberating way to understand what it is to be a reader than
reductionist views that relegate reading to a quantitative activity that can be gauged, measured

8

and calculated. As follows from this discussion, when considering approaches to teaching
reading, it is crucial to keep in mind the fact that reading, first and foremost, relates to our
Being-in the-world in ways that matter, and this points to the issue of educators actually
fostering and sustaining a student’s love of reading, which transcends the boundaries of the
classroom (Kohn, 1999). And, it is possible to nurture the love of reading by providing
opportunities for “children to choose what books they want to read,” because the stories they
tell have intimate, personal meaning for their lives (123). The philosophy of “giving students a
lot more control over their learning” is beneficial in facilitating the student’s openness to her
unique potential-for-Being, and this idea, we might say, is “part of what makes Whole
Language so effective and exciting” (123).
According to Kohn, attempting to teach reading through isolated activities that teach
components of reading and writing and various decoding skills represent the “stuffiest,
dreariest, silliest, most-out-of-context and inauthentic set of practices” for educators to adopt
(132). For example, “scientific-based” programs for older readers, which means that they are no
longer “developmental readers,” are typically structured around such practices as “spelling
and vocabulary quizzes based on lists of unrelated words, lessons on the separate elements of
punctuation and grammar, diagrammed sentences, penmanship practice, formulaic book
reports that could make anyone lose interest in even the most delightful story” (132). The
stories, or story-fragments, that are often employed by basal readers are selected more for the
purpose of teaching a “specific skill than on the basis of their literary quality” (134). This view
advocates learning in isolation and is based on the erroneous and fallacious assumption that if
one has mastered in advance the various parts that comprise the whole, the whole will be
understood, and, this of course, falls victim to the philosophical Fallacy of Composition, which
“consists of an erroneous inference from part to whole” (Pojman & Vaughn, 2012, 46). In this
view educators “trouble-shoot” in advance of engaging in the authentic activities of reading
and writing, attempting to anticipate the problems, miscues, and disruptions to the flow of
reading and understanding the text that students “might” encounter. Such methods
“decontextualize” problems in order to solve them in advance, and by decontextualizing the
learning there is a movement in abstraction away from the legitimate context of reading. This
relates specifically to Nielsen’s (2007) critique of forms of learning and problem solving,
wherein the components that comprise the totality are approached separately and analyzed
through abstract thematic thought, this fosters the erroneous belief that the reader’s
understanding of the text occurs when things, or components (constituent parts), are taken out
of context in order for the reader to acquire a sense of comprehension through the teaching and
honing of separate (disparate) skill-sets. The danger in this method, according to Kohn (1999),
and this is what Dreyfus (1981), reading Heidegger calls an “objectifying practice,” is that it is
difficult for students to learn abstractly. This is precisely what “scientific-based” reading
strategies do, the “skills are removed from a meaningful context and learned as abstract rules,”
and as a result students who are taught reading in this manner are “least likely to succeed,”
and when teaching reading in this manner, education allows “meaning to take a back seat to
decoding” (129).3
To think about learning within a meaningful context as related to Heidegger’s (1962)
phenomenology, it is helpful to recall the intimate context within which Dasein’s concernful,
meaningful activities are always situated, wherein through Dasein’s original and ontological
mode of disclosing, the space and entities within the workshop show-up as meaningful to its
Being, which allows Dasein to discover, in terms of ontic transcendence, its relation to those
3

Watson (1994) writing on “Whole Language” outlines a schemata for developing a whole language philosophy that includes
the components of (1) belief; (2) practice; and (3) theory, and she adds, interestingly, despite outlining a tightly organized
philosophical flow-chart: “There are no hierarchal ability grouping intended in the ordering of my list, nor is there a formula for
mastering and moving from category to category” (603). The philosophy of whole language itself might be thought of as
occurring in praxis, and not in terms of the disingenuous understanding of theory-practice outlined above in relation to
traditional educational models. “I’ve learned,” states Watson, “that teachers can begin to build a whole language philosophy by
‘doing’ whole language strategies that they find appealing and that fit comfortably within their capabilities and expectations.
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entities and their way-of-Being – Dasein enjoys a familiarity only through the revelation and
understanding of the referential totality. For example, as Heidegger (1985) writes, “My
encounter with the room is not such that I first take in one thing after another and put together
a manifold of things in order to then see a room. Rather, I primarily see a referential whole”
(187). Dreyfus (2002) continues this line of thought:
I just take in the whole room. I do it by being ready to deal with familiar rooms and the
things in them. My “set” or “readiness” to cope with chairs by avoiding them or by
sitting on them, for example, is “activated” when I enter a room. My readiness is, of
course, not a set of beliefs or rules for dealing with rooms and chairs; it is a sense of how
rooms normally show up, a skill for dealing with them, that I have developed by
crawling and walking around many rooms (Dreyfus, 2001, 103).
“Circumspective” coping is neither reducible to a thematic mode of seeing nor brute
intuition, because the ease with which I navigate rooms develops in conjunction with and from
out of the many attempts to navigate rooms that have failed, out of the many instances where
my coping was disrupted in some way or another. As Dreyfus states, “Any specific activity of
coping takes place on the background of more general coping,” and although it is the case that
Being-in-the-world is ontologically prior, “in Heidegger’s special sense, a priori – as the
ontological condition of the possibility of specific activities, it is the case that “being-in-theworld is just more skilled activity” (107). This understanding of “circumspection” occurring
within a context or system of related assignments relates to Goodman’s (1989) description of
reading wherein the reader already has “expectations” of what she will encounter within the
context of reading, based on what she has encountered in the past, because, according to
Goodman, reading involves the use of “language cues selected from perceptual input on the
basis of the reader’s expectation” based on what is occurring within the context (127). The
reader navigates the text as a whole, and not by means of focusing on isolated encounters with
disparate components of the reading process, rather, because the whole is laid bare, or disclosed,
the reader has the “ability to anticipate that which will be seen,” just as she is able to hear, as a
holistic occurrence, based on the “ability to anticipate what has not yet been heard” (128). As
Goodman (1996) goes on to say, “Reading isn’t simply recognizing words in succession.
Something propels you forward as you read, helps you anticipate so well what’s coming that
you simply use cues from the print to move constantly toward meaning,” and the “expectation
of form, structure and – most of all – meaning is what reading is all about (40-41, emphasis in
original).
As stated earlier, the revelation of both referential totality and the original for-the-sake-ofwhich as world occurs through moments of disruption, and in such moments the significance of
the various assignments as they relate to and have meaning for my Being shine forth. In a
similar manner, disruptions, miscues, and problems in the learning process also reveal
instances and opportunities for learning within Whole Language. Reading and writing are
undoubtedly structured by a system of interrelated components, which include speech sounds
(phonology), spelling (orthography), word meaning (semantics), grammar and syntax, and
patterns of word construction (morphology), all of which are essential for fluency and reading
comprehension. Since Whole Language instruction recognizes that these components cannot be
taught or learned in isolation, it embraces moments of disruption and instances where miscues
occur, for example, in spelling, grammar, and the mechanical aspects of writing (punctuation) –
when words are misspelled, when grammar shows up in a skewed manner, when the syntax of
the sentences one is reading or writing is disrupted due to improper or missing punctuation, all
of these moments are instances where the context of reading and the totality of references is lit
up, and we see that spelling words correctly or grammatically structuring a sentence to ensure
its meaning is not for the sake of the mere activity itself, but rather belongs to the referential
totality that is the process of reading, and is essential if we are to disclose and discover meaning,
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and, in an important manner, acquire the ability to communicate that meaning to the others
with which we dwell in the world-of-reading.
The same basic philosophy of learning is present when it comes to teach vocabulary: It’s
integrated into the process of becoming more competent at reading and writing, not
presented as a list of definitions to commit to memory. Students might keep their own
lists of words whose meanings they want to know and remember, and they might begin
in each case by taking an educated guess at what a word means (based on the sentence
in which it appears or a part of the word that’s familiar) before looking it up (Kohn,
1999, 136).
And the same thing goes for grammar and punctuation, where it is the teacher’s job
to help kids become thoughtful observers of what they’re reading – appreciating the
good and criticizing the awkward – as well as skillful revisers of their own
writing…Children are encouraged to write constantly. They write notes to each other
(and may have mailboxes in their classroom for exchanging them) and letters to people
outside school. They write books that, at least in some schools, are actually catalogued
and shelved in the library (136).
Within the Whole Language debate, although phonics is really only a concern for early
readers, “phonics” is nevertheless a heated point of contention between advocates and critics.
“Phonics refers to the relationship between symbols and sounds. A child with ‘phonemic
awareness’ is one who can ‘decode a letter or pair of letters (such as th) and knows how to say
it” (Kohn, 1999, 120). Whole Language proponents claim that early readers do better learning
individual reading skills, e.g., letter-sound relationship or morphology of words (graphophonic
elements), within the context of reading. Advocates of Whole Language, while certainly not
denying the importance of phonics in reading, oppose the teaching of phonics in a “synthetic
manner,” i.e., at an isolated remove from the context of the activity of reading. This indicates,
as in scientific-based strategies for reading, that the cueing systems might be approached and
taught in isolation in order to ensure the successful reading instruction. Whole Language
proponents are not against teaching phonics, but they are concerned with the manner in which
phonics is taught: They vehemently oppose “synthetic phonics,” or phonics taught in isolation
from the cueing systems, which amounts to separate instructional lessons imparting and
honing skill-sets in graphophonic mechanics: “The camp usually designated as ‘pro-phonics’
believes in teaching sound/symbol relationships mostly, if not exclusively, through direct
instruction, in a way that is intensive and explicit, by means of very specific sequence of
lessons,” and they insist that “such direct instruction has to take the form of repetitive drilling
of isolated phonemes” (121-122). This approach is labeled “reductionist” because it reduces the
instruction of phonics, in isolation, to the centerpiece of what’s required to eventually read
proficiently for literacy. This belief misses the crucial philosophical view that “reading is more
than decoding a text” (124).
As Kohn argues, “A child filled full of phonics rules may be able to pronounce a word
flawlessly without having any idea what it means, much less what it’s relation is to the words
sitting around it” (124). Worksheet filled with unrelated words, stressing perhaps silent-e
words or words with double consonants in the middle, have little relation to a living text, they
sit lifelessly on the page. Scientific reading theories reduce the ability to recognize and
pronounce words to an isolated activity that is guided in advance by a theoretical method,
which removes the graphophonic cueing system from the context of the three “cuing systems”
of reading and then later reinserts it with the belief that the technical-theoretical training is
crucial to mastering the process of reading. In moments such as this, according to Heidegger
(1962), when the flow of circumspective coping is interrupted, by “thematizing” one or another
of the components within the system of relations, a new attitude emerges, we reveal a new

11

mode of Being that Heidegger calls the present-at-hand. “When this kind of talk is so
understood, it is no longer spoken within the horizon of awaiting and retaining an equipmental
totality and its involvement-relationships” (412/361). Here, we reduce things to and define
things exclusively in terms of “functional concepts,” and this indeed leads into Heidegger’s
critique of hyper-technical scientific learning theories, which are methods or ways of disclosing
things, entities, and Dasein that fail to properly explain “significance-meaning” as it emerges
from within the referential totality as related to Dasein’s Being. To account for the equipment
whole, scientific theories erroneously overlook that “significance-meaning” is always
antecedent to the parts of the relationship. Such theories wrongly view the complex totality as
being “Built up out of occurrent [present-at-hand] elements” (Dreyfus, 2001,115).
The basic intuition behind Heidegger’s critique of [hyper-technical scientific theories] is
that on “frees” occurrent [present-at-hand] properties [components] precisely by
stripping away significance. Therefore it is highly implausible that one can reconstruct a
meaningful whole by adding [or reintroducing] further meaningless elements…The
[scientific learning theorist] would hold that he has merely patiently to spell out the
relation of each type of equipment [component] to other types of equipment
[components] and thus gradually build up a representation of the equipmental whole
(Dreyfus, 2001, 116).
In the following passage, Kohn (1999) describes a method for “teaching” and “learning”
phonics, which is contextual and unfolds through the movement from whole to part to whole:
Teaching phonics might be conceived as beginning from the text, which has “significancemeaning” for the reader (whole) and then within the context of reading explore and address
the graphophonic issues as they arise within the unfolding of the other cueing systems (part)
and then weave this understanding into the reading while continuing with the text until other
issues, disruptions, or miscues arise (whole).
A Whole Language teacher proceeds from the assumption that there are a number of
ways to help beginning readers make sense of what’s on the page. They may follow the
words while someone reads them aloud to them. They may watch a teacher write down
familiar words, or even pick up a pencil and try to do that himself or herself. Once they
can recognize the first letter of the word, that, along with other clues from the context,
can help them predict the rest…First comes the story, then a brief detour to explain how
this particular word is pronounced (perhaps followed by a little bit of discussing about
similar words), and then back to the story (124).
Concluding Thoughts
In a highly speculative manner, incorporating an accessible philosophical language for
students and educators who might not be steeped in systematic philosophy, I have attempted
to distill the essence of both Heidegger’s phenomenology of “concerned, circumspective
coping” and the understanding of reading in Whole Language to show that is possible to relate
certain notions from Heidegger’s phenomenological-ontology to the understanding of reading
in Whole Language, specifically the concern with reading being taught as an activity that does
not, and indeed cannot, function outside of a tightly ordered referential totality of assignments
and meanings. We saw that the towards-which Heidegger philosophizes might be related to the
“goal” of reading and that the ultimate towards-which, the for-the-sake-of-which, represents the
overarching context of world within which reading ultimately has significance and meaning for
our Being. We also saw that scientific methods for teaching reading tend to isolate for direct
instruction, through the teaching of skills and techniques, the components of reading that are
really inseparable, and when we isolate components for analysis, we impede the process of
learning to read as an engaged and holistic activity. It was also possible to understand
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“problems” or miscues in the reading process in a new light, e.g., when students encounter
words they can’t pronounce or words they cannot spell, as opposed to revealing these
disturbances as isolated instances of skills that have failed, we have seen that such problems,
when viewed within the context of reading, always refer us back to the system itself and the
overarching referential totality of which is always a part. When we examine the system of
reading we find that it’s far more than learning and applying decoding skills, authentic reading
is about meaning, and finally, we saw that in light of Heidegger’s philosophy it is possible to
understand reading and writing in terms of meaningful ways to understand ourselves and the
world, and beyond, to communicate in a variety of ways our understanding to others. Reading,
it is possible to state, in an essential ontological manner, is related to our Being, which, as
Heidegger points out, is always an issue for us.
Scientific methods for teaching reading that are isolationist or atomistic reduce reading
to a system that must be decoded, assimilated, and performed with accuracy and fluency, and,
as we have seen, such a view ignores that reading and writing are primary and original modes
of encountering and communicating meaning in our lives. The conception and revelatory
potential of disruptions (problems) in Heidegger’s philosophy is radically other than
philosophies of hyper-technical scientific learning that seek to eradicate and overcome mistakes
through a greater and more thorough accumulation, assimilation, and organization of
knowledge, because mistakes indicate a lack or loss of predictable control of the situation
within the educational “environment.”4 Heidegger offers us a unique view of the revelatory
potential involved in reinterpreting our understanding of the problems we encounter in the
learning process. Traditionally, problems are to be “confronted,” “overcome,” “controlled,”
“avoided,” and ultimately, “eradicated.” This view of education, which is linked intimately
with social efficiency, believes that it is possible, and indeed perhaps best, to deal with our
problems from a purely epistemological perspective, and in fact, it is suggested that through
the application of one or another scientific method we can solve our problems through the
accumulation and the organization and reorganization of knowledge by means of “practical
learning theories” or applied “skill sets,” which we marshal with ever greater efficiency and
success. Yet, Heidegger offers us a unique way in which to view problems and problem solving
which points beyond epistemology to the realm of ontology. For there is a distinct revelatory
aspect bound up with moments when things fail, we see beyond the isolated instance of
breakdown, beyond the mere “thing-ness” of the tool that no longer functions, and catch sight
of the invariant categorial-ontological structures of Dasein’s Being and world, or as Polt (1999)
nicely articulates the phenomenon, we catch sight of the overarching “system of purposes and
meanings that organize our activities and our identity, and within which entities can make sense” (54).

4

Indeed Taylor & Richards (1989) stress that the issue of knowledge is one of the main factors when determining our
conception of education, crucial for the design, make-up, and construction of curricula. They identify the view that knowledge as
“objective” as the most prevalent epistemological view adopted within curriculum ideologies: “Conceptions of education also
involve important ideas about the nature of knowledge. In most conceptions, knowledge is assumed to be objective; a body of
principles, laws, theories, etc. which ar external to the learner…Here knowledge is ‘reified’ – made into an object of study which
exists independently of the learner and unaffected by his own particular ways of processing data and organizing experience”
(23).
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